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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
ANIERICAN INVEST~IENT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMl\fiSSION OF 
UTAH, and IRvVIN ARNOVITZ, 
R E. HAMMOND, H. P. LE~ 
THA1f and B. H. ROBINSON, the 
members of said Commission, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
8312 
BRIEF FOR THE COMMISSION 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
We cannot do otherwise than question the good 
faith of plaintiff in making the statements as to the 
facts which are contained in plaintiff's brief. At the 
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top of Page 2 and at Page 4 are palpable misstatements 
of fact. Plaintiff is described as ''a corporation organ-
ized under and by virtue of the Laws of the State of 
Nevada, and with its principal place of business at Ely, 
Nevada". At Pages 16 and 26, this same misstatement 
is implied in the argument and conclusion n1ade, and 
it is apparent that this wrong position is the essential 
part of plaintiff's petition before this Court. 
Plaintiff has not even paid the State Tax Commis-
sion the respect of referring to its decision which in-
cludes findings of fact and certain conclusions. In that 
decision, finding No. II is as follows: 
''During the year 1937 the books of the com-
pany were located at Ogden, Utah; directors' 
n1eetings were held at Ogden, Utah; income was 
received and dividends disbursed from Ogden, 
Utah; and stock certificates were held there." 
Conclusion No. II made by the Commission reads 
as follows: 
'''Petitioner's principal place of business dur-
ing 1937 was at Ogden, Utah, and it had no place 
of business in any other state." 
Of course, petitioner is entitled to attack this de-
cision and show that it is not supported by the evidence. 
But we cannot do other than feel aggrieved when the 
Commission's decision does not even n1erit the courtesy 
of repudiation. 
The facts contained in the record, however, are as 
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definite as the findings and conclusions of the Commis-
sion's decision indicate. The only sworn witness at the 
hearing was ~lr. J. Leo Cooney, the treasurer of the 
con1pany. He testified that the c01npany's books were 
kept in his office in Ogden until about the first of the 
year 1939, when they were n1oved to Elko, Nevada 
(Tr. 19); that all of the company's directors' meetings 
were held in Ogden in 1937 (Tr. 20); that the president 
and secretary of the con1pany resided in Ogden in 1937 
(Trs. 20-21), in addition to the treasurer, and that the 
two vice-presidents resided in Idaho (Tr. 21); that the 
stock certificates of the company were held in Ogden 
(Tr. 21); and that the company's funds which gave rise 
to dividends were kept in the First Security Bank at 
Ogden (Trs. 21-22). There is not one word of testimony 
in the transcript that petitioner had its principal place 
of business, or any other place of business, at Ely, 
Nevada, or any place else in Nevada or other than in 
the State of Utah, in the year 1937. The above-quoted 
finding of fact and conclusion, taken from the decision 
of the Commission, must therefore stand as establishing 
that the plaintiff's only place of business during 1937 
was at Ogden, Utah. 
The balance of the statement of the facts in plain-
tiff's brief is accurate, including the statement on Page 
3 as to the revenue of plaintiff in the year 1937. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
The difference in the fundamental fact as to where 
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plaintiff's principal place of business was located in 
1937 will alter much of plaintiff's argument and admit-
tedly makes a vast difference in the validity of the Cor-
poration Franchise Tax Law as applied to plaintiff. 
The questions discussed by plaintiff's brief may be 
stated as follows: 
1. Is plaintiff a holding company within the 
exemption provisions of R. S. U., 80-13-5 
(16)? 
2. Does the Corporation Franchise Tax Law 
apply to plaintiff? 
3. As applicable to plaintiff, is the Corpo-
ration Franchise Tax valid~ 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Is Plaintiff a Holding Company Within the Exemp-
tion Provisions of R. S. U., 80-13-5 (16)? 
The holding con1pany exemption provision reads as 
follows: 
''Corporations whose sole business consists 
of holding the stock of other corporations for 
the purpose of controlling the management of 
affairs of such other corporations, if such other 
corporations make returns under this chapter.'' 
It is admitted by plaintiff that it is not engaged 
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solely in holding the stock of other corporations for 
the purpose of managing then1, the statement being that 
plaintiff is ''primarily'' engaged in such business. 
(Brief, pp.2, 4.) The difference between engaging pri-
marily in an activity and engaging solely in the activity 
is certainly plain, since engaging solely in an activity 
means that nothing else is engaged in. The word '' pri-
marily'', on the other hand, raises a question of degree, 
and if activities other than holding company functions 
represent fron1 one to, let us say, forty-five per cent of a 
cmnpany's business, it would still be primarily engaged 
as a holding company. The indefiniteness of the word 
"primarily" may possibly be the reason its use was 
avoided by the Legislature. This interpretation corn-
ports also with the latter part of the exemption pro-
vision, which requires that the subsidiary corporations 
must make returns under the Franchise Tax Law before 
the exemption arises. Because of this, if any corpo-
ration is primarily engaged in holding company func-
tions and all of its subsidiaries make returns under the 
act, but it also has investment functions as to which no 
returns are made under the Franchise Tax Law, there 
is a pro tanto failure to cover the privilege of doing 
business in the state, and that failure is in direct propor-
tion to the volume of the investn1ent business of the 
corporation. Exemptions from tax are always strictly 
construed since they are not favored in the law. Cooley 
on Taxation, 4th Ed., Sec. 672 and cases there cited. 
Even if it be argued that where one branch of a 
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company's business is incidental to its chief business 
activity, no special tax will be applied to the incidental 
portion, such argument would not be available to plain-
tiff. The investment features of plaintiff's business 
represent a definite portion of its business and for the 
year 1937 gave rise to more than 40% of its total income. 
In Kehrer v. $tewart, 197 U. S. 60, 68-69, 25 S. Ct. 
403, 49 L. Ed. 663, the question arose whether a Chicago 
meat packing firn1 which shipped meat to Georgia for 
sale was subject to a Georgia tax, some of the meat being 
shipped pursuant to order and, therefore, a part of 
interstate commerce, and a very minor part being ship-
ped without previous order and, therefore, a part of 
intrastate commerce in Georgia. In determining the 
importance of the latter portion of the business, the 
court said: 
''The record does not show what proportion 
of such business is interstate and what proportion 
is domestic, although it is conceded that most of 
the business is interstate in its character. If the 
amount of domestic business were purely nominal, 
as, for instance, if the consignee of a shipment 
made in Chicago upon an order filled there, re-
fused the goods shipped, and the only way. of 
disposing of them was by sales at Atlanta, this 
might be held to be strictly incidental to an inter-
state business, and in reality a part of it, as we 
held in Crutcher v. l{entucky, 141 U. S. 47; but 
if the agent carried on a definite, though a minor, 
part of his business in the State by the sales of 
meat there, he would not escape the payment of 
the tax, since the greater or less magnitude of 
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the tax. There could be no doubt whatever that, 
if the agent carried on his interstate and domestic 
business in two distinct establishments, one would 
be subject and the other would not be subject to 
the tax, and in our view it 1i1akes no difference 
that the two branches of business are car:I·ied 
on in the sau1e establishn1ent." 
'Vhen the Legislature used the word "solely", the 
law will not be observed if in interpreting it the test 
is "prin1arily". 
Plaintiff refers to First Security Corporation of 
Ogden v. State Tax Commission, 91 Utah 101, 63 Pac. 
(2d) 1062, as supporting its views. With petitioner's 
analysis of the First Security Corporation case and 
with its application to the facts of this case, we do not 
agree. It is true that in the First Security Corporation 
case, according to the agreed statement of ·facts, the 
First Security Corporation held stock of the Amalga-
mated Sugar Company, which it bought, held or sold 
for investment as did the taxpayer in this case. But 
this fact was not considered by the Supreme Court in 
its opinion; on the contrary, it was assumed by the 
Court that the corporation was solely engaged in hold-
ing stock for the purpose of control and management 
of the corporations. At Page 107 of 91 Utah, the Court 
thus quoted the one question submitted by the taxpayer 
in that case : 
"~fay the legislature of the State of Utah 
impose on the First Security Corporation of 
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Ogden a franchise tax from which it would be 
wholly exmnpt were it not for the fact that it, 
a foreign corporation, is the owner of stock of 
other corporations, also foreign, which do not 
n1ake returns under the franchise tax laws of 
this State and which (foreign corporations) tran-
sact no business and have no property in the 
State of Utah, the business of the First Security 
Corporation of Ogden being strictly confined to 
the holding of stock in other corporations for the 
purpose of controlling the management of the 
affairs of such corporations, and which corpo-
rations, except those first mentioned, make re-
turns under the Utah Law~" 
The Court then went on to say: 
''The reason the Tax Commission claims the 
exen1ptiort does not apply to the First Security 
Corporation of Ogden is that the First Security 
Corporation holds stock in and manages from 
Utah at least two corporations foreign to the 
state of Utah doing business in the state of 
Wyoming.'' 
And then at Pages 106 to 109, it is stated: 
"It is conceded that, if it were not for the 
last clause, 'if such other corporations make re-
turns under this chapter,' the First Security 
Corporation of Ogden would be within the excep-
tion and no tax could be imposed.'' 
And again at Page 112 the Court thus indicated 
the facts which were being decided by that decision: 
''We assume from the terms of the stipula-
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tion that plaintiff, in so far as this case is con-
cerned, is a corporation whose sole business is that 
of controlling and managing the affairs of other 
corporations. As we understand the position of 
the Tax C01nmission, plaintiff was excluded from 
the exception because of the last clause of the 
section exen1pting such corporation 'if such other 
corporations make returns under this chapter.' '' 
(Italics ours.) 
Of course, the Court in that case was bound by the 
stipulation of facts. In its brief in the Supreme Court, 
the plaintiff First Security Corporation urged that it 
was a holding company exclusively, at least so far as 
its Utah business was concerned. At Page 4 of the 
defendant's brief, there was italicized a portion of Sec-
tion (f) of the stipulation of facts as follows: 
"Its sole activities in Utah consisted in hold-
ing stockholders' meetings at which reports were 
presented, and directors elected, and directors' 
meetings, at which matters connected with the 
control of the management of affairs of its sub-
sidiaries were considered.'' 
And although it appeared in Sections (d) and (e) 
of the stipulation that plaintiff owned certain stock of 
the Amalgamated Sugar Company, the stipulation pro-
vided: 
'' (e) 'x. * *. None of the certificates of stock 
issued by said corporations and owned by the 
taxpayer were kept in Utah during the period in 
question.'' 
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It nowhere appears in the stipulation that the First 
Security Corporation's only place of business was with-
in the State of Utah, nor even that its principal place 
of business was in this state; nor did it appear in what 
other states, if any, this Delaware corporation had quali-
fied and in which its investment business might have 
been carried on. 
That case is, therefore, far from conclusive of the 
instant case, in which the facts before the Court are 
different and in which there is no effort to confine the 
Court to a particular legal question. 
The rationale of the Court's opinion was somewhat 
as follows: A holding company which holds stock of 
subsidiary corporations only for the purpose of control-
ling and rnanaging the same is exempt from the corpo-
ration franchise tax. \Vhen a holding company holds for 
such purposes stock of some subsidiaries in Utah and 
some subsidiaries operating wholly without the state, 
the exemption would not apply only because of the 
companies' doing business outside the state. Utah can-
not constitutionally require that corporations doing no 
business in Utah pay a tax to the State of Utah; neither 
can Utah do this indirectly by requiring that they must 
pay a tax on a holding company's earnings unless they 
pay a tax on the out-of-state subsidiaries' earnings. It, 
therefore, follows that the First Security Corporation 
need not file a corporation tax return, since it only 
holds stock for the· purpose specified, and its subsidiaries 
~ither file returns or are constitutionally exempt from 
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the filing of returns. The decision does not go beyond 
this holding. 
But in this case it is adn1itted that it is not the ''sole 
business'' of the taxpayer to hold stock ''for the pur-
pose of controlling the 1nanagen1ent of affairs'' of such 
corporations. Sin1ilar facts were present in the First 
Security Corporation case but were not urged upon the 
Court, and the Court's opinion assun1ed that the sole 
business of the corporation was holding stock for the 
purpose stated in Subsection (16) of R. S. U., 1933, 
80-13-5. In this case, the taxpayer admitted that it did 
not hold the stock of Ohio Oil Company or of Socony 
Vacuum Company for the purpose of controlling the 
management of the affairs of the companies. (Tr. 23.) 
It was, therefore, not solely engaged in the business 
of holding stocks for these purposes. This prevents the 
taxpayer from coming under the exemption of Subsec-
tion (16) and makes the corporation subject to filing 
of corporation franchise tax returns under the tel'lns 
of the act. 
The Tax Commission does not admit that the plain-
tiff meets the first test of the holding company exemp-
tion provision. In the First Security case the parties 
wanted the Court to decide the second portion of that 
exemption provision, namely, whether a failure to make 
returns under the Franchise Tax Law where the sub-
sidiaries were doing business' only in foreign states re-
moved the objection. This Court analyzed that question 
at great length and decided that such an interpretation 
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of the law would be contrary to the Constitution and that 
such was, therefore, not intended. We now admit that 
under the First Security case, if the plaintiff is engaged 
solely in holding the stocks of other companies for the 
purpose of managing them and such subsidiaries either 
make returns under the law or there is no power in the 
State of Utah constitutionally to require returns from 
such companies, then the plaintiff cannot be taxed. It 
is our position that plaintiff is not engaged solely in 
such business but that a very considerable portion of its 
activity is investing its funds in stocks of corporations 
for other purposes than managing them, and that it is, 
therefore, not exempt under the holding cmnpany pro-
vision, regardless of whether the companies whose stocks 
are held by plaintiff pay corporation franchise tax to 
Utah. 
Furthermore, we request that the Court's holding 
and opinion in the First Security case be reexamined in 
light of recent cases discussed under Point III of this 
brief. 
II. 
Does the Corporation Franchise Tax Law Apply 
to Plaintiff? 
Plaintiff does not come under the holding company 
exemption because it is not engaged solely in holding 
stocks for the purpose of managing the corporations 
whose stocks are owned. It is placed outside this ex-
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en1ption by reason of its business of buying and selling 
the stocks of corporations for investment or speculation 
purposes. This 1nakes the plaintiff subject to the Corpo-
ration Franchise Tax Law unless this law was not 
1neant to apply to the business of an investment corpo-
ration. By He\yised Statutes of Utah, 80-13-1 ( 5), the 
definition of doing business is made so broad as to in-
clude all the legitimate functions of a corporation. The 
definition is as follows: 
''The ter1n 'doing business' includes any 
transaction or transactions in the course of its 
business by a bank or corporation created under 
the laws of this state, or by a foreign corporation 
qualified to do or doing intrastate business in 
this state, and shall include the right to do busi-
ness through such incorporation or qualification.'' 
If this definition means what it says, a corporation 
which is qualified to do business in this state is required 
to pay for that franchise or privilege, regardless of 
whether it exercises its franchise. This interpretation 
1s reenforced by 80-13-3, which commences: 
"Every bank or corporation, '" '"' '"' for the 
privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or 
for the privilege of doing business in the state, 
shall annually pay tD the state, etc.'' 
Plaintiff admits that it was qualified to do business 
1n the State of Utah in 1937. (Tr. 21.) This without 
more would appear to bring plaintiff within the statute. 
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On the assumption that plaintiff is required actually 
to do business in the State of Utah before coming under 
the provisions of the law, the definition of doing business 
as including ''any transaction or transactions in the 
course of its business'' appears to include all kinds of 
business carried on by a corporation. This is corrobo-
rated by the fact that there are specific exemptions for 
many types of corporations. This can mean only that 
all business is included and unless exempted is subject 
to the tax; and unless plaintiff con1es within Subsection 
(16), the exen1ption provided for holding companies, it 
is not exeinpt under the act. Further corroboration as 
to the taxability of investment companies is found in 
Section 21 of the act, which specifically deals with 
; 'rents, interest and dividends derived from business 
done" either inside or outside the state. This is the 
type of income accruing to investment companies which 
ue by such treatment definitely placed under the act. 
This question was quite definitely settled by this 
Jourt in California Packing Corporation v. State Tax 
Jommission, 97 Utah 367, 376-379, 93 Pac. (2d) 463, 
;vhere the income from investments of the California 
~acking Corporation was considered as to whether it 
;hould be allocated within or without the state; and 
.hat it was such income as places the corporation receiv~ 
ng it under the Franchise Tax Law was hnplicit in the 
lecision. 
But the California Packing Corporation case did 
tot decide ·whether the income such as plaintiff here 
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received from its Socony Vacuum stock and its Ohio Oil 
stock was derived from business done within or without 
the state. 
Subsection (1) of 80-13-21 reads as follows: 
'' Hents, interest and dividends derived frmn 
business done outside this state less related ex-
penses shall not be allocated to this state." 
Subsection (3) then provides: 
'' Hents, interest and dividends derived fron1 
business done in this state less related expenses 
shall be allocated to this state." 
It is submitted that the test of where the business 
giving rise to the receipt of dividends is done is not 
the place where the operating company is located. A 
company engaged in the making of investments and the 
handling of securities for purposes of earnings and 
profits is engaged in that business at the place where 
its work is done. If its offices are in the State of Utah 
and it simply holds the stock of corporations located 
outside the state, buys and sells such shares of stock 
at its Utah office, clips coupons here, and receives 
dividends here, these dividends are derived '' frmn busi-
ness done in this state". If, however, a Utah corpo-
ration, engaged in manufacturing in the State of Utah, 
has an office in New York City, which office handles 
the investment of surplus funds, makes decisions, holds 
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the muniments of title and receives ·dividends, such 
dividends are derived ''from business done outside this 
state'' because the investment office is located outside 
the state. It, therefore, appears that since the Amer-
ican Investment Corporation had its principal office in 
Ogden and did all of the work connected with the buy-
ing, holding and selling of Ohio Oil Company and Socony 
Vacuum Company stock in Utah, the receipt of dividends 
fron1 these shares and the gain realized through sale of 
shares was all incon1e ''derived from business done in 
this state''. 
This applies equally to the dividends of the operat-
ing banks controlled and managed by the taxpayer. It 
is true that these banks cannot be compelled to file 
returns with the State of Utah and that if the corpo-
ration is exempt except for the failure of these banks 
to file returns, it would be invalid under the First Securi-
ty case to hold that the holding company was not within 
the exemption. But here the exemption is inapplicable 
because the taxpayer holds stock for other purposes than 
controlling or managing the affairs of the corporations 
whose stock is so held. Once the exemption is made 
inapplicable, the statute applies in toto and there is no 
requiren1ent of deductions, failure to include income, or 
specific allocations outside the state, unless the character 
of the earnings is such as to be so treated by the 
;;;pecific terms of the statute. Since the receipt of the 
-lividends of the Idaho hank which is owned by the tax-
rmyer does not place such dividends within any of the 
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deductions or allocation provisions outside the state, 
such inc01ne is taxable. Nothing in First Security Cor-
poration of Ogden v. State Tax Con11nission, supra, is 
to the contrary. 
In the California Packing Corporation case at 
Pages 377 to ~78, after discussing the rule as to taxation 
of intangibles at or apart fron1 the don1icile of the owner, 
the Court said: 
"But we have found no case holding that the 
inc01ne from intangibles owned by a nonresident 
and held by him or it outside the state, which 
inc01ne is paid and received without the state, 
and derived fron1 a business not operating in the 
state can for any purpose or by any n1ethod be 
taxed by the state. But our statute, as quoted 
above, seems to n1anifest a clear intent on the 
part of the legislature that so called 'financial 
incon1e' not derived from business done in Utah 
should not be included in gross receipts for tax 
computation purposes by the state.'' 
The Court's use of the phrase ''derived from busi-
ness done" is not as plain as could be desired, but it 
was as plain as was necessary by the decision in that 
case since the muniments of title there before the Court 
were held outside of the state at the office where the 
company's financial business was conducted, and the 
stocks were of operating companies doing business out-
side the state. It was, therefore, apparent that the finan-
cial revenue of the California Packing Corporation was 
not assignable to Utah. As to plaintiff, however, the 
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facts are entirely different. Plaintiff's only place of 
doing business in 1937 was within the State of Utah 
where it qualified. There it maintained its office, carried 
on all its corporate activities, received its income, in-
cluding interest and dividends, and declared its own 
dividends to its stockholders. If plaintiff was doing 
business at all, it was doing business in Utah. The 
franchise in question is plaintiff's franchise for carry-
ing on its corporate functions for the year 1937. There 
is no attempt to tax plaintiff for the franchises of its 
subsidiaries in foreign states. 
The difficulties n1entioned but not decided in the 
California Packing Company case arise where the cor-
poration is qualified in different states, having many 
~ffices from some of which one kind of business is car-
ried on and from others a different kind of business. 
Here plaintiff's only office was in Utah and all the 
:msiness that it did was in Utah. If the company earned 
:my money, it was through the business which it carried 
)n in the State of Utah, and it therefore comes within 
Subsections 3 and 5 of Section 21 of the act. 
Plaintiff makes the point that the capital gain from 
;ale of Ohio Oil Company and Socony Vacuum stocks 
vas not ''rents, interest or dividends'' and was not a 
~apital gain within the meaning of Subsections 2 and 
~ of Section 21, which deal with ''gains from the sale 
1r exchange of capital assets consisting of real or tan-
~ible personal property". At Pages 23 to 25 of its hrief, 
)laintiff assumes that the Commission allocated these 
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gains under Subsections 2 and 4. The Commission's 
decision does not so indicate. These gains are compara-
ble to the interest and dividends allocated by Subsections 
1 and 3 and could, therefore, be treated in a similar 
manner under the rule of ejusdem generis. But it is 
unimportant to decide whether such income is specifically 
allocable in this case, because the company was doing 
business only in the State of Utah. If the Court should 
hold that these gains from intangibles do not come with-
in either Subsections 1 and 3 or Subsections 2 and 4, 
such income will be allocated according to Subsection 5, 
which reads : 
"If the bank or other corporation carried on 
no business outside this state, the whole of the 
remainder of net income may be allocated to 
this state." 
Under the Commission's decision that plaintiff was 
doing business in no other state than Utah in 1937, all 
of its income will be allocated to this state, whether it 
be under Subsection 3, 4 or 5 of Section 21. 
Plaintiff wrongfully contends that its only place of 
doing business in 1937 was in Nevada. Realizing, as this 
Court must, that if the corporation was qualified to do 
business and was doing business only in the State of 
Utah for the year 1937, it cannot reasonably be argued 
that its income should be allocated outside the state 
for the purpose of computing its Utah tax. Its franchise 
was valuable where it was doing business, and that was 
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in Utah alone. There remains only to consider whether 
the statute thus applied to a foreign corporation whose 
only place of business is in Utah is valid. 
III. 
As Applicable to Plaintiff, is the Corporation 
F"ranchise Tax Valid? 
It must ever be borne in mind in corporation fran-
chise tax cases that the incident of the tax is the fran-
chise or privilege of doing business. If a corporation is 
doing business within the State of Utah or has a fran-
chise for doing business here, it is taking advantage of 
the state's laws and of the state's protective system, as 
well as its opportunities and purchasing power. The 
United States Supreme Court has definitely held that 
where a corporation is enjoying these privileges, it 
comes within the jurisdiction of the state for tax pur-
poses. In State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Company, 
decided December 16, 1940, 85 L. Ed. 222, at Page 225, 
the court discussed the general power of a state to tax 
~ corporation, and in that case the Supreme Court has 
:sone beyond anything that was before believed taxable 
:md far beyond the incidents of the present case in hold-
_ng a corporation taxable by a state. It thus stated the 
[undamentals of the taxing power: 
''For constitutional purposes the decisive 
issue turns on the operating incidence of a ehal. 
lenged tax. A state is free to pursue its own fiscal 
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policies, unmnbarrassed by the Constitution, if 
by the practical operation of a tax the state has 
exerted its power in relation to opportunities 
which it has given, to protection which it has 
afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by 
the fact of being an orderly, civilized society. 
''Constitutional provisions are often so gloss-
ed over with co1nn1entary that imperceptibly we 
tend to construe the commentary rather than the 
text. 'Ve cannot, ho·wever, be too often reminded 
that the limits on the otherwise autonomous 
powers of the states are those in the Constitution 
and not verbal weapons in1ported into it. 'Taxable 
event', 'jurisdiction to tax', 'business situs', 'ex-
traterritoriality', are all compendious ways of 
implying the impotence of state power because 
state power has nothing on which to operate. 
These tags are not instruments of adjudication 
but statements of result in applying the snle con-
stitutional test for a case like the present one. 
That test is whether property was taken without 
due process of law, or, if paraphrase we must, 
whether the taxing power exerted by the state 
bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities 
and benefits given by the state. The simple but 
controlling question is whether the state has given 
anything for which it can ask return. The sub-
stantial privilege of carrying on business in vVis-
consin, which has here been given, clearly sup-
ports the tax, and the state has not given the 
less merely because it has conditioned the demand 
of the exaction upon happenings outside its own 
borders. The fact that a tax is contingent upon 
events brought to pass without a state does not 
destroy the nexus between such a tax and tran-
sactions within a state for which the tax is an 
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exaction. See Continental Assurance Company v. 
':flennessee, supra. See also Equitable Life So-
ciety v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143; Maxwell v. 
Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525; Cornpania de Tabacos v. 
Collector, 275 U. S. 87, 98; New York ex rei. 
Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308; Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412; Atlantic Re-
fining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U. S. 22; Curry v. 
:McCanless, 307 U. S. 357." 
The dissenting opinion in that case relied on Con-
necticut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 58 S. Ct. 
436. The disagreement between the majority and the 
n1inority was as to whether Wisconsin was affording 
protection to the incident of taxation involved in the 
.J. C. Penney case. As to the general principle, there 
was no disagreement between the Connecticut General 
case and the Penney case as above quoted. At Page 80 
of 303 U. S. in the Connecticut General case, the court 
said: 
''But the limits of the state's legislative jur-
isdiction to tax, prescribed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, are to be ascertained by reference to 
the incidence of the tax upon its objects rather 
than the ultimate thrust of the economic benefits 
and burdens of transactions within the state. As a 
matter of convenience and certainty, and to secure 
a practically just operation of the constitutional 
prohibition, we look to the state power to control 
the objects of the tax as marking the boundaries 
of the power to lay it. Hence it is that a state 
which controls the property and activities within 
its boundaries of a foreign corporation admitted 
to do business there may tax then1." 
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The plaintiff con1es squarely within the last section 
of this quotation since its property was all held in the 
State of Utah, and all of its activities were conducted in 
the State of Utah in 1937. These general quotations 
should be sufficient to establish validity of taxation of 
plaintiff. 
Our corporation franchise tax is based upon net in-
conle of a corporation which is allocated entirely to 
Utah if the company does no business elsewhere (which 
is true in this case), and is allocated partly within the 
state and partly without the state where the con1pany 
does business in both places. (This is the most that can 
be said for plaintiff's position, although actually plain-
tiff contends it was not doing business in Utah. If such 
be the case, we admit that the corporation is not subject 
to taxation.) 
One statement in the opinion in First Security Cor-
poration demands consideration. At the bottom of Page 
115, the Court said : 
''A tax based on the net income of the business 
done and property owned without this state by a 
foreign corporation is as direct a burden on prop-
erty beyond the jurisdiction of the state as is a fee· 
of 25 cents on each $1,000 of authorized capital 
stock of a foreign corporation.'' 
We have no quarrel with this statement, since it does 
not state that the foreign corporation has its principal 
office in Utah; but it is not accurate if meant to reflect 
the constitutional limits of taxing power of a dmnestie 
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corporation or a foreign corporation whose principal 
or only place of business is in this state. Refer to Point 
III. 
It has definitely been held that a state may tax the 
income of its residents whether individuals or corpora-
tions, and this question is no longer open in any state. 
People ex rei. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 
57 S. Ct. 466; 
Wiseman v. Interstate Public Service Com-
pany, 191 Ark. 255, 85 S. W. (2d) 700; 
Lawrence v. Mississippi State Tax Commis-
sion, 162 1\fiss. 338, 137 So. 503, aff 'd. 286 
u.s. 276; 
Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission, 
50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S. E. 563, aff'd. 182 
Ga. 568, 186 S. E. 558. 
In People v. Graves, supra, at Page 313 of the U.S. 
Reports, the court said, in holding a resident subject to 
tax because he enjoyed the protection of the state and 
privileges which it afforded: 
"Neither the privilege nor the burden is af-
fected by the character of the source from which 
the income is derived. For that reason income is 
not necessarily clothed with the tax immunity 
enjoyed by its source. A state may tax its resi-
dents upon net incon1e from a business whose 
physical assets, located wholly without the state, 
are beyond its taxing power, (Citing cases)." 
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This general principle, which cannot successfully 
be disputed, applies equally to foreign corporations which 
have qualified within a state and there established their 
principal offices. This was true in Montag Brothers v. 
State Revenue Commission, supra. 
This general principle was thus stated in an anno-
tation at 98 A. L. R. 1444: 
''It seen1s to be well settled that a franchise, 
excise, or license tax upon domestic corporations, 
measured by or based on the capital stock of the 
corporation, is not unconstitutional or beyond 
the power of a state, merely because such stock 
represents, in whole or in part, property located 
outside the state." 
In line with this, it has been held that taxation of 
dividends on stock held by a corporation doing business 
in the taxing state, even though the company paying 
the dividends operated entirely without the state, is 
valid. 
State ex rel. Manitowoc v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 161 Wis. 111, 152 N. W. 848; 
People ex rel. New England Dressed Meat Co. 
v. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 408, 50 N. E. 53, 41 
L. R. A. 228; 
Cooley on Taxation, Fourth Edition, Sees. 893, 
894, 900, 1753; 
Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 251(b) (Par. 1299, 
C. C. H. Federal Tax Service, 1940). 
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Since no two corporations operate exactly in the 
same way, and since no other state has a Corporation 
Franchise Tax Law just like Utah's, it is impossible to 
find a case on all fours with the instant case. However, 
decisions have been made in other states involving all 
the questions that can be raised in this case so far as 
power of the state to impose the tax is concerned, thus 
establishing the validity of the tax as applied to plaintiff. 
Against the objection that the interstate commerce 
clause of the ~--,ederal Constitution prevents states from 
taxing their incon1e, corporations have been held subject 
to franchise taxes where they established offices within 
a state and carried on corporate functions sufficient to 
make all or a part of their property or inc01ne subject 
to tax. Thus, in Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner 
of Corporations of :Massachusetts, 298 U. S. 553, 56 S. 
Ct. 887, 80 L. Ed. 1328, it was held that a Delaware cor-
poration engaged in the wholesale lumber business, but 
with its principal office in 1\fassachusetts, was taxable 
in Massachusetts where it kept its corporate books and 
records, held its directors' meetings and declared divi-
dends, and where it maintained a sales office as the head-
quarters for salesmen soliciting orders both within and 
outside the state, which orders were filled in interstate 
commerce; but the tax there was measured by a propor-
tion of its capital assets. And in a case resembling the 
instant one very much except that the ·question of inter-
state commerce was raised, the court held as to the 
Copper Range Company in the course of its opinion 
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entitled Cheney Brothers Co. v. :Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 
147, 155, 38 S. Ct. 295, 62 L. Ed. 632: 
"This is a Michigan corporation whose ar-
ticles of association conten1plate that it shall have 
an office in Boston. It is a holding company and 
owns various corporate stocks and bonds and 
certain 1nineral lands in :Michigan. Its activities 
in l\1:assachusetts consist in holding stockholders' 
and directors' meetings, keeping corporate rec-
ords and financial books of account, receiving· 
n1onthly dividends from its holdings of stock, de-
positing the n1oney in Boston banks and paying 
the same out, less salaries and expenses, as divi-
dends to its stockholders three or four times a 
year, . The exaction of a tax for the exercise of 
such corporate faculties is within the power of 
the State. Interstate commerce is not affected~,., 
See also the decision as to the Champion Copper 
Company, which follows that as to the Copper Range 
Company. 
A case closely resembling the principal case is 
People ex rel. Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc., v. Graves, 
et al., (1937) 250 App. Div. 149, 294 N. Y. S. 995. That 
case involved the taxability of a Delaware corporation 
which had established an office within the State of New 
York for the conduct of a general investment business. 
Petitioner contended that it was not doing business with-
in the State of New York, although it had its office there, 
and contended further that even if it were, it was also 
doing business in other states so as to avoid imposition 
of a tax under the following statute: 
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"If a corporation is subject to a tax under 
the provisions of this article of the tax law, and 
it maintains no regular place of business outside 
of this state, except a statutory office, it shall be 
taxed on a base measured by its entire net income, 
or entire issued capital stock, or otherwise; as 
hereinbefore provided.'' 
It would be difficult to provide more specifically for 
the taxation of such a corporation as the American In-
vestment Company under the facts of its operation, which 
the defendant feels are established by the record in this 
case. The Graves case, therefore, gives a square decision 
as to the validity of a statute taxing such a corporation 
on its entire net income. As to what the Allied Tobacco 
Corporation was doing, the court said: 
"It did not rent an office, but owned office 
furniture located in the offices occupied by its 
president and vice president in New York City, 
and there had part-time office employees drawing 
varying aggregate annual salaries up to $6,500. 
:Meetings of the directors were held at this office. 
It had no other office except the statutory office 
in Delaware. It incurred expenses in New York 
for legal services, printing, stationery, postage, 
rental of safe deposit vault, and for stock registry 
and stamps. In reports to the State Tax Depart-
ment it stated its business to be trading and deal-
ing in securities '" * *.'' 
After holding that a corporation's activities consti-
tuted "business" within the requirements of the New 
York statute, and that carrying on an investment busi-
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ness is doing business, even though the stocks held repre-
sented corporations operating in other states than New 
York, the court said: 
"The assertion that petitioner's capital was 
all outside the State of New York rests upon the 
ancient 1uaxiln (nwbilia sequuntur personmn) 
that uwvables follow the person of the owner, and 
that as petitioner secured its franchise to be a 
corporation in Delaware, the juristic concept fol-
lows that its person, and therefore its intangible 
property, was there. Latterly intangibles have 
been determined to have a taxable situs of their 
own which may be away from the domicile of the 
owner if they have become integral parts of some 
local business. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. 
State of :Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 213, 50 St. Ct. 
98, 7 4 L~ Ed. 371, 65 A. L. R. 1000. The certifi-
cates of stock kept in New York, to be traded in 
there, had acquired a 'business situs' and a 'corn-
mercia! domicile' there at the place where 'the 
management functioned.' (vVheeling Steel Corp. 
v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773, 80 L. I-Dd. 
1143.)" 
In Commonwealth v. Wilkes-Barre and H. R. R. Co., 
251 Pa. 6, 95 Atl. 915, there was before the Pennsylvania 
court a New Jersey corporation authorized to hold bonds, 
stocks and other securities of public or pri~ate transpor-
tation or other utility companies. It owned the stock of 
some utilities within the State of Pennsylvania (as plain-
tiff owned the stock of a Utah bank) and established its 
principal office in the State of Pennsylvania. Although 
differing fron1 plaintiff in that the "\Vilkes-Barre Con1-
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pany held only stock of Pennsylvania operating com-
panies, it was like the instant case in that the company 
held stocks at its principal office where its general cor-
porate functions were carried on. Under our statute, the 
Wilkes-Barre Company would probably be a holding 
company, and, therefore, within the exernption, but on 
the question of the power of the state to impose a tax, 
the case is a good precedent for the instant case. The 
court there said : 
"It does not appear the acts which were done 
in this State were a mere incident of defendant's 
corporate existence, but were the performance of 
the function and business of the corporation itself. 
Taking the various acts, which are admittedly 
done in this State, namely, the holding of di-
rectors' meetings, the maintenance of a bank 
account, the purchase of the stock and bonds of 
the Pennsylvania corporations as one of the 
direct objects of its incorporation, the residence 
of the treasurer in Pennsylvania and the perform-
ance of every act necessary to the actual business 
which the company is transacting and they clear-
ly constitute a doing business within this State.'' 
A similar case is Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. 
v. Rhodes, 37 R. I. 141, 94 Atl. 50, where it was held that 
a corporation is "carrying on business" in Rhode Is-
land ''if it is doing some of the work or is exercising 
some of the functions for which it was created". And 
in People ex rei. Manhattan Silk Co. v. Miller, (1908) 
125 App. Div. 296, 109 N. Y. S. 866, affirmed 197 N. Y. 
577, 91 N. E. 1119, it was held that holding stock for in-
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vesbnent constitutes the doing of business for profit for 
tax purposes. 
A somewhat analogous problen1 is raised by corpora-
tions which hold real or personal property in other states 
upon rental which they receive and distribute in the state 
seeking to i1npose the tax. It is held on these facts that 
the corporation is doing business for franchise tax pur-
poses. 
State v. National Cash Credit Ass 'n, 224 Ala. 
629, 141 So. 541; 
:Maguire v. Tax Com1nission, 230 :Mass. 503, 
120 N. E. 162, Aff 'd. 253 U. S. 12. 
These authorities establish the power of a state to 
tax income received by its residents or by foreign cor-
porations having their principal places of business within 
the state. They establish also that the activities inci-
dent to holding stock for management, or investment 
of funds by a corporation constitute doing business. A 
franchise tax is therefore valid as applied to a foreign 
corporation with its only place of business in Utah, whose 
corporate functions consist of investment of funds, trans-
actions in securities, holding stocks for management of 
the corporations, and the usual internal corporate af-
fairs. 
A re-examination of the principles governing the 
First Security case, is therefore, appropriate. If a for-
eign corporation is doing business in this state, thereby 
availing itself of our orderly laws, our opportunities and 
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our protective forces, it is subject to franchise taxation 
here. If its only place of business is in Utah all of its 
income, from whatever source derived, is taxable. Utah 
has seen fit, however, not to tax all of such income but 
to make certain exemptions, one of which, relating to 
holding companies, is based on the principle of avoiding 
taxing the same earnings twice. If an operating com-
pany pays a franchise tax to the state based on its earn-
ings and those earnings are passed on to its parent 
corporation, it is reasonable to regard this as taxing the 
same earnings twice and reason for exempting the par-
ent corporation. But this principle was applied so as to 
exempt holding companies only when their sole corpor-
ate functions were holding company functions. If the 
corporation engages in other business, it loses its exemp-
tion. And the exemption does not exist unless all the 
subsidiaries pay franchise tax in Utah; this is consistent 
with the very reason for the exemption, which is to avoid 
under some circumstances taxing the same operating 
earnings twice. To say, as the First Security case does, 
that this would compel foreign corporation subsidiaries 
doing no business in Utah to pay the tax in order to 
obtain an exemption for the parent is hardly accurate. A 
tax on all the parent's earnings would be valid, from 
whatever source derived, and that validity is not changed 
by granting an exemption to other corporations when 
the exemption is based on a reasonable classification. It 
is not a question of forcing subsidiaries to pay a tax, 
but rather of measuring the value of the franchise exer-
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cised by the parent in this state and, if solely a holding 
company, granting an exetnption where the subsidiaries 
have once paid a tax on earnings. The only constitu-
tional question that should be considered is the reason-
ableness of the classification, which was definitely not the 
basis of the holding in the First Security case. 
But that case need not be overruled to uphold the 
tax here. The court there assumed, as the parties de-
sired, that the company met the first test of 80-13-5 (16), 
and only the second test, namely, whether the subsidi-
aries paid a franchise tax in Utah, was examined. Here 
it is strongly urged that the word" solely" in the ·statute 
means "entirely" or "wholly", as it does in the dic-
tionary, and that when a substantial part of plaintiff's 
activities are other than those of a holding company, it is 
not ''solely'' a holding company. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's wrong premise was unfortunate. If its 
premise were established, the Commission would admit 
that the franchise tax does not apply, because it would 
not be doing business in Utah. But instead, plaintiff was 
doing business only in Utah and not in any other state 
in 1937, and it must, therefore, pay a franchise tax unle-ss 
the statute exempts it. The act plainly applies, initially, 
to a company doing the business of a holding company 
and investment company in Utah. The exemption in 
80-13-5 (16) does not apply to plaintiff for two reasons: 
First, because it is not engaged solely in holding stocks 
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of other corporations for the purpose of managing them; 
and, second, its subsidiaries do not all pay corporation 
franchise tax in Utah. As so applied, the law is valid from 
a constitutional standpoint. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the de-
cision of the defendant State Tax Commission be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. 
ALVIN I. SMITH, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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